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ABSTRACT 
 
This study finds that ID theft rates tend to be an increasing function of the unemployment rate 
and the proportion of the population concentrated in urban areas, and a decreasing function of 
the relative amount of resources devoted to laws enforcement and the percentage of 
individuals who claim a religious affiliation.  We also find ID theft to be an increasing function of 
the extent of undocumented immigration, internet access, on the other hand, is found to 
negatively impact the incidence of ID theft, underscoring the decisive role of immigration and 
economic variables as determinants of ID theft.  Educational attainment in the U.S. does not 
seem to be a factor. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the U.S., Cyber crime has grown dramatically in recent years (New York Times, 2006), and 
identity theft is one of its most pernicious manifestations (Federal Trade Commission, 2006).  
Criminals who illegally assume the identity of another individual (“ID theft”) usually do so for 
one or more of the following three reasons.  They intend: (1) to steal the victim’s financial 
assets; (2) to obtain goods and services under false pretenses, i.e., without paying; or (3) to use 
the victim’s identity as a “cover” for other forms of their activities. 
 
With respect to reason (3), undocumented immigrants may be among the major offenders, or 
at least this is what Michael Chertoff, the Homeland Security Director declared in December 
2006 (Swarns, 2006).  Chertoff argues undocumented immigrants may engage in ID theft so 
they can obtain someone else’s social security number, thus enabling them to obtain and hold a 
job, open bank accounts, obtain a driver’s license, and so forth. 
 
Another commonly asserted hypothesis with respect to ID theft is that is a creature of the 
Internet.  A Washington Post reporter put it this way: “Few Internet security watchers believe 
2007 will any brighter for the millions of fraud-weary consumers already struggling to stay 
abreast of new computer security threats and avoiding clever scams with banking, shopping, or 
just surfing online” (Krebs, 2006). 
 
In this study, we use state-level data to identify possible determinants of ID theft rates in the 
U.S.  We treat ID theft rates as a function of economic conditions, the urban vs. rural nature of 
the environment, law enforcement, expenditures, religious adherence, Internet access, the 
extent of undocumented immigration, and education.  Interestingly, consistent with Mr. 
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Chertoff’s assertion, we find that the percentage of undocumented immigrants in a state is 
highly significant predictor of the incidence of that state’s ID theft; moreover, this variable also 
has by far the largest beta coefficient in our predictive equation.  Hence, whereas more work 
certainly needs to be done on this subject, it appears that there is some validity to the notion 
that the most common forms of ID theft are immigration driven and therefore relate to the 
need of undocumented immigrants to obtain legitimate credentials that will enable them to 
hold jobs in the U.S. , to obtain driver’s licenses and bank accounts, and the like. 
 
2. WHAT IS IDENTITY THEFT  
 
The Identity Theft and Assumption and Deterrence Act, U.S. Public Law 105-318 (1998), 
identifies an ID thief as someone who: 
 
…..knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, any name or number that may be used 
alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual with intent to 
commit, or to aid and abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or 
that constitutes a felon under any applicable State or local law. 
 
This definition of ID theft is purposely broad and seemingly was designed to deal with 
unforeseen circumstances brought about by technology.  As we shall now see, much that 
related to ID theft depends upon interpretation. 
 
3. THE INCIDENCE AND REPORTING OF IDENTITY THEFT 
 
According to the Federal Trade Commission (2006), state ID theft rates varied in 2005 from a 
low of 24.8 per 100,000 persons in North Dakota to a high of 156.9 per 100,000 persons in 
Arizona.  The median states Hawaii and Alaska had rates of 63.5 and 63.4 respectively.  
California, with a 125.0 rate, ranked third among states, but had the largest number of reported 
ID thefts (45,175) in 2005.  Table summarizes these data. 
 
Unfortunately, as is true for nearly all crime data, some ID theft crimes go unreported or even 
unrecognized.  Furthermore, not all forms of ID theft are defined as crimes, or at least fail to be 
treated as such.  Often to the applause of the public, member of the media sometimes assume 
false identities in order to pursue a story and, providing they do not attempt to obtain personal 
financial benefit, this variety of ID theft is not considered illegal in many states, or, if it is, it 
frequently goes unprosecuted.  Law enforcement authorities themselves sometimes assume 
false identities in order to capture alleged law violators.  In other cases, individuals engage in 
“pretexting” (assuming a false identity in order to obtain information).  Hewlett-Packard 
notably engaged in pretexting in 2006 in an attempt to obtain telephone records as a means of 
tracking down a corporate leak.  The congress responded by approving a bill to criminalize 
pretexting aimed at obtaining someone’s telephone records (Rogers and Mathews, 2006), but 
other forms of pretexting do not necessarily violate federal, state, or local laws. 
 
 3 
 
In still other cases, individuals effectively assume a false identity on web sites such as 
www.myspace.com and www.facebook.com by virtue of exaggerating their own virtues, or 
even blatantly lying about their essential characteristics (a man telling a woman on 
myspace.com that he’s 6’2” and 200 muscular pounds rather than admitting he’s 5’4” and 200 
pounds).  Such episodes may be frowned upon but are seldom prosecuted unless accompanied 
by a subsequent financial or sexual crime. 
 
Recently, several very large security breaches have been discovered by businesses and 
governmental agencies that apparently exposed millions of individuals to potential ID theft 
(New York Times, 2006).  A case in point is the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, which in 
2006 lost personal data for an estimated 28.6 million veterans.  Hackers penetrated the 
financial company Card Systems Solutions in 2005 and gained personal data for more than 40 
million Visa and MasterCard account holders.  In the former case, it appears this has not led to 
significant ID theft, whereas in the latter case, the “jury is still out.”  Should we regard these 
instances as ID theft because, in fact, individual identities were stolen, or focus instead only on 
those cases where the theft has recognizably led to criminal use of that ID?  Actual Federal 
Trade Commission practice leans in the latter direction and therefore often tends to minimize 
the actual occurrence of ID theft. 
 
The relevant point is the ID theft data published by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reports 
provide only a partial window on ID theft and are not without their flaws (Newman and 
McNally, 2005).  An act one individual considers ID theft may not be interpreted similarly by 
another individual, or it may go unreported.  Indeed, according to the FTC, 61 percent of ID 
theft victims do not notify a police department (Federal Trade Commission, 2006).  Further, 32 
percent of reported ID thefts were not discovered until a year after the theft occurred (Federal 
Trade Commission, 2006).   
 
Nevertheless, the FTC data, which focus on credit card, phone and bank fraud, as well as 
employment and government documents fraud, easily constitute the best information 
presently available for the U.S.  Perhaps more important, even if these data are only 
approximations of reality, they nonetheless are being used for purposes of resource allocation 
and public policy. Both the Department of Justice and the Federal trade Commission pay 
elected officials usually treat these data as sacrosanct. 
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TABLE 1. IDENTITY VICTIMS BY STATE (PER 100,000 POPULATION) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  Victims per             Number of                                         Victims per            Number of 
Rank State 100,000 People      Victims               Rank State 100,000 People Victims   
1 Arizona 56.9 9,320 26       Alaska 63.4  421 
2 Nevada 130.2 3,144 27       Louisiana 62.6  2,811 
3 California 125.0                  45,175 28  Massachusetts 62.5  3,999 
4 Texas 116.5                  26,624 29   Ohio 62.4  7,155 
5 Colorado 97.2 4,535 30 Minnesota 58.7  3,015 
 
6 Florida 95.8                    17,048 31 Alabama 58.7  2,675 
7 Washington  92.4 5,810 32 Kansas 58.5  1,606 
8 New York 90.3                    17,387 33 Arkansas 58.2  1,617 
9 Georgia 87.3                     7,918 34     Rhode Island 58.2  626 
10 Illinois 87.3                    11,137 35 Tennessee 57.2  3,412 
 
11 Maryland 86.6 4,848 36 So.Carolina 56.8  2,416 
12 New Mex. 84.7 1,634 37 Nebraska 52.3  919 
13 Oregon 81.7 2,973 38 Idaho 52.1  745 
14 N. Jersey 75.5 6,582 39 Wisconsin 50.3  2,782 
15 Michigan 70.5 7,139 40 Mississippi 49.9  1,458 
 
16 Delaware 69.1 583 41    N. Hampshire 49.2  645 
17 Virginia 68.2 5,183 42 Wyoming 44.0  224 
18 Oklahoma 67.7 2,403 43 Kentucky 43.5  1,815 
19 Missouri 67.6 3,920 44 Montana 42.5  398 
20 Utah 67.5 1,668 45 W.Virginia 37.3  677 
 
21 N.Carolina 67.1 5,830 46 Maine 37.2  491 
22 Indiana 67.0 4,201 47 Iowa 36.7  1,090 
23 Connecticut 65.9 2,313 48 Vermont 32.3  201 
24 Pennsylvania63.6 7,908 49 S.Dakota 30.0  233 
25 Hawaii 63.5 810 50 N.Dakota 24.8  158 
 
Median: 63.4/63.5 Unweighted Mean: 65.69 
______________________________________________________________________________
Source: Federal Trade Commission (2006, Table 329)  
 
4. PREVIOUS WORK 
 
Newman and McNally (2005, p.11),in the 2005 review of the ID theft literature they conducted 
for the U.S. Department of Justice, commented that “…there are only a handful of studies that 
focus exclusively on identity theft, but they vary widely in quality and scope”.  In fact, while 
analytical studies are scarce, there have been many articles that either have talked about what 
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is perceived to be the emerging menace of ID theft or have focused on the technological tricks 
thieves use to steal someone’s ID.  Representative are Smith and Lias (2005) and Smith 
(2005),who talk about the extent to which ID theft occurs, the manner in which it occurs, and 
what countermeasures individuals might take to reduce their vulnerability. 
 
Smith and Lias (2005), for example, surveyed 75 managerial employees in the Pittsburgh area, 
whereas Smith (2005) focused on a sample of 107 “working professionals” in the Pittsburgh 
metropolitan area to ascertain how they deal with ID theft.  Newman and McNally’s 2005 
survey contains only a handful of other references to research studies, and these studies tend 
to rely heavily upon survey responses.  Star systems (2002) polled approximately 3,000 
individuals via telephone; Gartner (2003) sampled 2,445 households; Harris Interactive (2003) 
focused on 3, 462 adults; and the Federal Trade Commission (2003) conducted a randomized 
survey of 4,057 individuals. 
 
A more recent survey of the Council of Better Business Bureaus and Javelin Strategy and 
Research (Johannes, 2006) relied upon 5,000 telephone interviews and concluded, in contrast 
to most other studies, that the growth of ID theft has been contained.  Even so, the study 
concluded that 8.9 million American Adults had been victimized by ID theft in 2005 and that the 
mean financial loss had risen to $6,383 per occurrence (Johannes, 2006, p.1). 
 
The common thread in these studies is their descriptive nature.  They describe the breadth and 
width of ID theft and nearly always talk about useful precautions individuals should take in 
order to minimize their potential exposure to ID thieve (illustration: never give out your social 
security number in response to an e-mail).  They are notable for not focusing on the 
determinants of ID theft --- for example, which populations are the most likely to commit ID 
theft?  Does poverty play a role?  Is ID theft an urban phenomenon? Thus, the record of 
research on ID theft is essentially bare insofar as analytical and/or empirical studies are 
concerned.  This study is a first step in the direction of providing such an analysis. 
 
5. A SIMPLE MODEL 
 
Whereas some data are available that relate ID theft to metropolitan areas, the best political 
unit data available relate to the 50 states.  Consequently, our goal is to explain variations in the 
rate of ID theft using this state-level data.  We estimated reduced-form equations of the 
following form: 
 
  Ri = a + bXi + ui 
 
where: 
Ri = rate of reported ID theft per 100,000 individuals during the year 2005 in state “I” 
Xi = vector of state characteristics such as population demographics, economic status, apparent 
religious commitment, urban versus rural residence, education, Internet access 
ui = error term 
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We adopt six categories of explanatory variables for each state: 
 Economic conditions (UNEMP, the state’s unemployment rate in 2014 
 Urban/rural nature (URBAN, the percent of the state’s population living in an urban area 
in 2000) 
 Law enforcement expenditures (LAWENEXP, law enforcement expenditures per capita in 
the state, 2002) 
 Extent of religious affiliation (REL, the percentage of state’s population that identifies as 
being either Christian or Jewish, 2000) 
 Internet access (INTGER, the percent of households connected to the Internet, 2003) 
 Incidence of undocumented immigrants (UNDOCIMM, the estimated percent of the 
state’s population consisting of undocumented immigrants, as of March, 2005) 
 The percent of a state’s population, 25 years or older, that has earned a bachelor’s degree 
or higher (EDUC) 
 
Data sources were the U.S. Census Bureau (2006. Tables 27, 581, 71, 431, 1150, 218). The Pew 
Hispanic Center (2005), and Federal Trade Commission (2006, Table 329) 
 
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 2 reports two multiple linear regressions based upon the model.  The signs on the 
independent variables in Regression One correspond with reasonable a priori prediction, except 
perhaps for the negative sign on the Internet access variable, which is discussed below.  In 
particular, the coefficient on the undocumented immigrant’s variable is positive and significant 
at the one percent level and boasts a very large β-coefficient.  This should not be surprising in 
light of Table 1, where one can see that the states with the largest incidence of ID theft also 
have the largest incidence of undocumented immigrants.  Here, however, we have documented 
that relationship in a ceteris parabis context in which other relevant factors such as economic 
conditions, the extent of urban population, law enforcement, expenditures, religious 
adherence, and Internet access are controlled for. 
 
We do not know whether undocumented immigrants commit more or less serious crimes of ID 
theft, it is reasonable to conclude, however, that their present dramatically increases the 
incidence of ID theft.  Specifically, a one percent increase in undocumented aliens in a state 
generates an 8.546 unit increase in that state’s increase in that state’s rate of ID theft per 
100,000 residents.  This translates to a 13.01 percent increase in the typical state’s ID theft rate.  
Thus, the effect of an increased in undocumented aliens on state ID theft rates is quite elastic. 
 
It is not surprising that state unemployment rates generate higher state rate of ID theft.  This 
relationship is statistically significant at the one percent level.  Similarly, our finding that 
“urbanity” –highly concentrated urban populations in an environment– is conducive to ID theft 
corresponds with intuition with this estimated coefficient being significant at the one percent 
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level.  Arguable, it is both more difficult to commit ID theft in a rural situation (and perhaps less 
need to do so as well). 
 
One potential deterrent of ID theft is law enforcement.  States that expend more resources on 
law enforcement per capita may well be better situated to deal with ID theft, other things held 
constant.  We find this to be potentially true, although this relationship is weak since the 
coefficient is just barely significant at the ten percent level.  It is easy to hypothesize that 
generalized law enforcement expenditures that are not target at ID theft apparently have only a 
minimal effect upon the incidence of ID theft. 
 
Another plausible deterrent to ID theft is religious belief and practice.  IF one believes as a 
moral tenet that ID theft is wrong, then ID theft is likely to be less prevalent.  Using the percent 
of the adult population that declares itself to be either Christian or Jewish as a proxy for 
religious adherence, greater religious adherence appears to yield lower rates of ID theft, 
holding other things constant.  This relationship is statistically significant at the five percent 
level.  
 
If there is a surprising result, is the sign on the Internet access coefficient.  Ceteris paribus, the 
negatives sign suggests that increased Internet access within states diminishes ID theft within 
the states.  This result conflicts with the views of those who see ID theft as an Internet-based 
phenomenon.  This view appears to be false.  State variations in ID theft are much more 
sensitive to other influences, particularly the presence of undocumented aliens in a state.  
Holding economic conditions, urbanity, religion and other factors constant, Internet access may 
actually to some extent be a proxy for sophistication in the use and protection of sensitive, 
private information.  That is, if I had Internet access in my home in 2003, I well might have been 
less likely to place myself in situations where my social security number or driver’s license could 
be stolen, but more likely to have erected Internet defenses against scams, “phishing”, spy 
bots, and other techniques that might induce me to supply such information, willingly or 
unwillingly. 
 
Regression Two is strictly parallel to Regression One, except an education variable, EDUC (the 
percent of the population aged 25 or higher that has earned a bachelor’s degree or higher) has 
been added as an argument.  It adds no explanatory power; it is not statistically significant and 
has a very low β-coefficient.  This finding supports the view that most ID theft is not an upper 
income, high education activity.  Instead, ID theft appears to be much more strongly related to 
the presence of unemployment in a state, the urban/rural nature of a state, and the presence 
of undocumented immigrants in that state.  It could still be true that the most costly financial 
episodes of ID theft involve highly educated, upper income individuals, but he bulk of  ID theft 
cases appears to be more closely connected to other factors that are not usually associated 
with high incomes and high levels of education. 
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TABLE 2. DETERMINANTS OF ID THEFT, 2005 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Regression Coefficients, t-Statistics and β-Coefficients 
Independent 
Variables  Regression One  Regression Two 
UNEMPL  5.448   5.685 
   (1.41)***   (1.45)*** 
   β = .21   β = .22 
 
URBAN  .387   .363 
   (.132)***   (.135)*** 
   β = .085   β = .21 
 
LAWENEXP  .001   .001 
   (.001)*   (.001) 
   β = .085   β = .078 
 
RELIGION  -.317   -.338 
   (.135)**   (.138)** 
   β = .13   β = .14 
 
INTERNET  -.395   -.561 
   (.243)*   (.315)** 
   β = .092   β = .13 
 
UNDOCIMM  8.546   8.546 
   (.911)***   (.915)*** 
   β = .69   β = .69 
 
EDUC     .349 
      (.419) 
      β = .063 
 
CONSTANT  20.46   21.87 
   (18.33)   (18.47) 
 
R2 (adj.)  .884   .884 
F   63.49***   54.13*** 
 
***probability = .01;  **probability = .05;  *probability = .10 
 
Notes: All regressions White’s heteroskedasticity adjustment (1980).  The t-statistics and β 
coefficients are absolute values.  The significance tests are two tailed. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
These are interesting results, but we hasten to note the caveats dispensed by Friedman (1991), 
Christ (1995), and Tomek (1993), who warn of the perils associated with strong public policy 
conclusions based upon the statistical significance of coefficients in single regression equations.  
The have pointed out we should pay more attention to consistent results confirmed in 
appropriately rigorous testing circumstances than to results, however strong, that emanate 
from a single study.  State-level ID theft data necessarily yield limited conclusions.  Much more 
work needs to be done at the level of metropolitan areas, cities, and individuals in order for us 
to reach stronger conclusions. 
 
This said, it does appear (among other things) that a strong statistical relationship exists 
between the presence of undocumented immigrants in a state and that state’s ID theft rate.  
Michael Chertoff, the nation’s Director of Homeland Security, surmised that undocumented 
immigrants have been heavily involved in ID theft (Swarns, 2006).  At this point, his speculations 
appear to be on target, and a significant proportion of ID theft could be eliminated if attention 
were paid to ways and means by which undocumented immigrants illegally both acquire and 
then utilized personnel ID information belonging to other residents of the U.S. 
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